



# BEYOND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

NEWSLETTER FOR STRENGTHENING AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR ABOLITION WITH JULY 2013 ARTICLES

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## In-Depth Reports



### **Ex-Envoy's Account Clarifies Iran's 2003 Nuclear Decision**

WASHINGTON - Newly published recollections by the former French ambassador to Iran suggest that Iran was not running a covert nuclear weapons programme that it then decided to halt in late 2003, as concluded by U.S. intelligence in 2007. Ambassador Francois Nicoullaud recounted conversations with high-ranking Iranian officials indicating that Tehran's then nuclear policy chief – and now president-elect – Hassan Rouhani did not know what research projects relating to nuclear weapons had been carried out over the years. ➤ Pages 2-3



### **Israel Resumes Threats Against Iran as Experts Urge Patience**

WASHINGTON - As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu resumed his threats to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, 29 former senior U.S. experts and foreign diplomats urged President Barack Obama to show greater flexibility in anticipated negotiations following the inauguration of President-elect Hassan Rouhani. "While it will take time to secure an agreement to resolve all concerns, diplomacy will only succeed if we are prepared to leverage existing sanctions and other incentives in exchange for reciprocal Iranian concessions," according to the letter. ➤ Pages 4-5

## What Others Say



### **North Korea and a Nuclear Weapons Ban**

To abolish nuclear weapons, North Korea and all states would have to join the ban before its entry into force, for three reasons. First, the nuclear ban (or abolition) treaty, often called a Nuclear Weapons Convention, would not create true abolition unless all states are parties to it. Second, current nuclear powers in all likelihood would not join unless the ban when enacted is truly global. (There already exists the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has been joined by all but nine states as "non-nuclear weapon" parties.) Third, unanimity of accession by states would give the ban unprecedented geopolitical force for on-going compliance by states - desirable in itself, and a crucial incentive for today's nuclear weapon possessors to actually renounce their arsenals. Nuclear Deterrence Works in Indo-Pak Ties ➤ Pages 6-7-8

### **"Ban the Bomb" Resonates Anew**

When the 12-year-old son of a friend saw a badge with the slogan "Ban the Bomb", he asked "what bomb?" The slogan may belong to an earlier generation but the threat of nuclear arms remains a deadly reality. This is the largely forgotten elephant in the room which the world must address before it's too late. ➤ Pages 9-10

### **Africa: New Approaches to Nuclear Weapon Disarmament**

Tuesday 16 July marked the anniversary of the first nuclear weapon test carried out by the United States (US) in southern New Mexico in 1945. Between then and September 1992, the US tested 1 030 nuclear weapons - all conducted by the Los Alamos National Laboratory. ➤ Pages 10-11

### **The Perils of Nuclear Folly**

Recently, the well-known website [www.foreignpolicy.com](http://www.foreignpolicy.com) examined 12 factors to determine what constituted failed states. "Postcards from hell, 2013" lists failed or "expected to fail states". Somalia tops the list, while Afghanistan is placed at number seven. ➤ Pages 12-13

## Civil Society Perspective

Continuing the Struggle by David Krieger | President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation ➤ Page 14

CNDP Criticises India for Activation of Nuclear Submarine and Missile Test ➤ Page 15

Trident still has nowhere to go ➤ Page 15



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### Ex-Envoy's Account Clarifies Iran's 2003 Nuclear Decision

By GARETH PORTER\*

WASHINGTON (IPS) - Newly published recollections by the former French ambassador to Iran suggest that Iran was not running a covert nuclear weapons programme that it then decided to halt in late 2003, as concluded by U.S. intelligence in 2007.

Ambassador Francois Nicoulaud recounted conversations with high-ranking Iranian officials indicating that Tehran's then nuclear policy chief – and now president-elect – Hassan Rouhani did not know what research projects relating to nuclear weapons had been carried out over the years.



The conversations described by Nicoulaud in a Jul. 26 New York Times op-ed also portray Rouhani as having difficulty getting individual researchers to comply with an order to halt all research related to nuclear weapons.

The picture of Iranian nuclear policy in 2003 drawn by Nicoulaud is different from the one in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, which concluded that Iran had halted "its nuclear weapons program". That conclusion implied that Iranian government leadership had organised a programme of research and development aimed at producing a nuclear weapon.

Nicoulaud recalled that a high-ranking Iranian official confided to him in late October 2003 that Rouhani had just "issued a general circular asking all Iranian departments and agencies, civilian and military, to report in detail about their past and ongoing nuclear activities."

The conversation came immediately after Rouhani had concluded an agreement with the foreign ministers of the UK, France and Germany on Oct. 21, 2003, Nicoulaud recalled. The same official explained that "the main difficulty Rouhani and his team were encountering was learning exactly what was happening in a system as secretive as Iran's," wrote Nicoulaud.

A few weeks after, the French ambassador learned from a second official, whom he described as "a close friend of Rouhani", that Rouhani's nuclear policy team had issued instructions to halt projects relating to nuclear weapons.

The Iranian official said the team was "having a hard time", because, "[p]eople resist their instructions,"

according to Nicoulaud. The official remarked that it was difficult to "convince researchers to abruptly terminate projects they had been conducting for years".

In an e-mail to IPS, Nicoulaud said he did not believe the Iranian government had ever approved a nuclear weapons programme. "The first challenge

for Rouhani when he took hold of the nuclear," said Nicoulaud, "must have been to get a clear picture of what was going on in Iran in the nuclear field."

Rouhani had been the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) since 1989 and would not only have known about but would have been involved in any government decision to establish a nuclear weapons programme.

"I guess that most people, [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei included, were surprised by the extent of the activities," Nicoulaud told IPS.

Nicoulaud's recollections are consistent with published evidence that nuclear weapons-related research projects had begun without any government authorisation. Despite an Iranian policy that ruled out nuclear weapons, many Iranian officials believed that a nuclear weapons "capability" would confer benefits on Iran without actually having nuclear weapons.

But the meaning of such a capability was the subject of ongoing debate. Nasser Hadian, a well-connected Tehran University political scientist, wrote in late 2003 about two schools of thought on the option of having a "nuclear weapons capability" but not the weapons themselves.

One definition of that option was that Iran should have only the capability to produce fuel for nuclear reactors, Hadian explained, while the other called for Iran to have "all the necessary elements and capabilities for producing weapons". ☺

*\*Gareth Porter, an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. national security policy, received the UK-based Gellhorn Prize for journalism for 2011 for articles on the U.S. war in Afghanistan.*



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That debate had evidently not been officially resolved by a government decision before Rouhani's appointment. And in the absence of a clear statement of policy, figures associated with research centres with military and defence ministry ties began in the latter of the 1990s to create their own nuclear weapons-related research projects without the knowledge of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).

Such projects were apparently begun during a period when the Supreme National Security Council was not exercising tight control over the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), the Ministry of Defence or the military industrial complex controlled by Defence Industries Organisation related to nuclear weapons.

By the mid-1990s, AEOI was already taking advantage of the lax supervision of its operations to take actions that had significant policy implications without authorisation from the SNSC.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, then the spokesman for Iran's nuclear negotiating team, recalls in his memoirs that in January 2004, Rouhani revealed to him that AEOI had not informed the SNSC about a policy-relevant matter as important as the purchase of the P2 centrifuge designs from the A. Q. Khan network in 1995. AEOI officials had misled him, Rohani said, by claiming that "they had found some information about P2 centrifuges on the Internet and are studying it!"

When Rouhani was named to take over as nuclear policy coordinator in early October 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was demanding a full accounting by Iran of all of its nuclear activities. Rouhani's circular to all civilian and military offices about nuclear work came soon after he had promised the IAEA that Iran would change its policy to one of full cooperation with the IAEA.

At the same time, Rouhani moved to tighten up the policy loophole that had allowed various entities to start weapons-related nuclear research.

Rouhani anticipated resistance from the bureaucratic entities that had nuclear weapons-related research projects from the beginning. He recalled in a later interview that he had told President Mohammad Khatami that he expected that there would be problems in carrying out the new nuclear policy, including "sabotage".

The sequence of events surrounding Rouhani's new nuclear policy indicates that he used Khamenei's public posture that nuclear weapons were forbidden according

to Islamic law to ensure compliance with the ban on such research projects.

Around the same time that Rouhani ordered the bureaucracy to report on its nuclear-related activities and to stop any research on military applications of nuclear power in late October, Khamenei gave a speech in which he said, "In contrast to the propaganda of our enemies, fundamentally we are against any production of weapons of mass destruction in any form."

Three days later, Rouhani told students at Shahrud Industrial University that Khamenei considered nuclear weapons as religiously illegal.

That same week, in an interview with San Francisco Chronicle correspondent Robert Collier, Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor of the conservative newspaper Kayhan and an adviser to Khamenei, alluded to tensions between the Rouhani team and those researchers who were not responding to or resisting the Rouhani circular.

Khamenei was forcing those working on such projects to "admit that it is forbidden under Islam", Shariatmadari said. He also suggested that the researchers resisting the ban had been working "clandestinely".

After the U.S. intelligence community concluded in November 2007 estimate that Iran had halted a "nuclear weapons program", a U.S. intelligence official said key pieces of evidence were intercepted communications from at least one senior military officer and others expressing dismay in 2007 that nuclear weapons-related work had been shut down in 2003.

But U.S. intelligence officials said nothing about what kind of work was being shut down, and revealed no further evidence that it was a "nuclear weapons program" under the control of the government.

Nicoullaud's recollections suggest that the 2007 estimate glossed over a crucial distinction between an Iranian "nuclear weapons program" and research projects that had not been authorised or coordinated by the Iranian regime.

Nicoullaud told IPS he believes the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which controls Iran's ballistic missile programme, was also carrying out a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. The IRGC's own ministry had been merged, however, with the old Ministry of Defence to form a new ministry in 1989, which implies that any such clandestine programme would have necessarily involved a wider military conspiracy. [IPS | July 30, 2013] □





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### Israel Resumes Threats Against Iran as Experts Urge Patience

By JIM LOBE

WASHINGTON (IPS) - As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu resumed his threats to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, 29 former senior U.S. experts and foreign diplomats urged President Barack Obama to show greater flexibility in anticipated negotiations following the inauguration of President-elect Hassan Rouhani.

"While it will take time to secure an agreement to resolve all concerns, diplomacy will only succeed if we are prepared to leverage existing sanctions and other incentives in exchange for reciprocal Iranian concessions," according to the letter.

It was signed by, among others, former U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs Thomas Pickering and Bruno Pelleau, the former deputy director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

"Further, in the lead-up to Rouhani's inauguration, it is critical that all parties abstain from provocative actions that could imperil this diplomatic opportunity," said the letter, which was also signed by Peter Jenkins, the former British ambassador to the IAEA, and Paul Pillar, a veteran CIA analyst who served as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005.

"For the U.S., no further sanctions should be imposed or considered at this time as they could empower hardliners opposed to nuclear concessions at the expense of those seeking to shift policy in a more moderate direction," according to the letter.

It was released on the eve of a meeting on Jul 16, 2013 of senior officials of the so-called P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, Russia plus Germany), which has been negotiating with Iran over its nuclear programme since 2006.

Both Netanyahu's comments, which during a widely viewed Sunday CBS News programme (on Jul. 14, 2013), and the letter come as the Obama administration grapples with the aftermath of Jul 3 military coup d'etat in Egypt, the ongoing civil war in Syria that appears to be going badly for the U.S.-backed opposition, and new uncertainties about the pace and timing of the U.S. with-



drawal from Afghanistan, as well as increasingly bleak prospects for peace talks with the Taliban.

Netanyahu downplayed the relative significance of these other crises and complained about what he said was the lack of a sense of urgency in Washington about Iran's nuclear programme.

"(A)ll the problems that we have, however important, will be dwarfed by this messianic, apocalyptic, extreme regime that would have atomic bombs," warned the Israeli leader, reverting to the kind of rhetoric he has generally avoided for much of the past year.

He also renewed his past threats to take unilateral military action, insisting, "I won't wait until it's too late."

He called for the P5+1 to demand that Iran halt all enrichment of nuclear material, shut down an underground enrichment facility near Qom, and remove and remove its existing stockpile of enriched uranium from its territory.

Those demands, he said, "should be backed up with ratcheted sanctions...(a)nd, if sanctions don't work, ...they have to know that you'll be prepared to take military action; that's the only thing that will get their attention."

Netanyahu also characterised Rouhani, whose election last month was greeted among experts here with both surprise and cautious optimism given his explicit appeal to moderate and reformist sectors in the Iranian electorate, as a "wolf in sheep's clothing". "Smile and build a bomb," he said of Rouhani's diplomatic skills and alleged strategic aim. ☺

*Photo: President Obama talks with Prime Minister Netanyahu at Ben Gurion International Airport in Tel Aviv, Israel, on Mar. 20, 2013. Netanyahu has complained about what he said was the lack of a sense of urgency in Washington about Iran's nuclear programme. Credit: White House/Pete Souza*



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Netanyahu's remarks were not well-received by some administration officials. "We did not regard the interview as helpful," said one who asked not to be further identified.

Indeed, the administration, which just imposed a new set of economic sanctions against Iran Jul. 1, has quietly made clear since Rouhani's election that it opposes any additional sanctions before the next round of P5+1 negotiations, which are expected to take place in September, at least one month after Rouhani's inauguration Aug. 4.

Briefing reporters late last week, senior officials said Washington is not prepared to offer new concessions until it and its P5+1 partners receive a formal response to an offer they tabled at the last round of talks with Iran in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in April 2013.

In exchange for Iran's suspending its 20-percent enrichment of uranium and transferring its existing 20-percent stockpile out of the country, the Western powers in the group offered to ease sanctions on the gold and precious-metal trade and some Iranian petrochemical exports as a confidence-building measure (CBM).

Officials told reporters that the offer should not be seen as a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposal and that, if Tehran wanted a more comprehensive deal, the P5+1 would be prepared to discuss it.

"If Iran says, yes, we are interested in the CBM but let's talk about something larger, alright," one official was quoted as saying. "If they say they are interested in all three measures on 20 percent [enriched uranium], but are looking for more sanctions relief, [then our response will be], 'What are you looking for? Here's what we want in return.' This is a negotiation."

The officials also stressed that the administration has called for direct bilateral talks with Iran within the framework of the P5+1 but that Tehran has so far ignored the proposal.

"We think they would be valuable," one official was reported as saying. "We will reinforce that in any appropriate way we can."

During his electoral campaign, Rouhani criticised Iran's current negotiating team headed by one of his rivals, Saeed Jalili, for its inflexibility. In his first post-election press conference, Rouhani said relations with Washington are "an old wound that needs to be healed," although

he did not commit himself to bilateral talks. Iran's Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is believed to have the ultimate authority with regard to both Tehran's nuclear programme and ties with the U.S., has often expressed scepticism about the value of direct talks with Washington but has not ruled them out either.

Netanyahu's hawkish words have been echoed in recent weeks in Congress where the Israel lobby exercises considerable influence.

Earlier this month, all but one of the 46 members of the Republican-led House Foreign Affairs Committee sent a letter to Obama calling on him to increase pressure on Iran by closing loopholes in existing sanctions and adding new ones despite Rouhani's victory. The letter anticipates an effort to pass a new round of sanctions in the house before Rouhani's inauguration.

At the same time, however, a bipartisan letter to Obama co-authored by Rep. Charles Dent, a Republican from Pennsylvania, and Rep. David Price, warned that "it would be a mistake not to test whether Dr. Rouhani's election represents a real opportunity for progress toward a verifiable, enforceable agreement on Iran's nuclear program..."

It said Washington should avoid "engaging in actions that ...weaken his standing relative to hardliners within the regime who oppose his professed 'policy of reconciliation and peace'".

That letter has so far gathered a not-insignificant 61 signatories in the 435-member House.

Despite that effort, administration officials said the House may indeed approve new sanctions before the next round of P5+1 talks but that the Senate was unlikely to quickly follow suit.

In the letter released Monday, the 29 experts and former government officials very much echoed the message of the Dent-Price letter, stressing that the "major opportunity" represented by Rouhani's presidency should not be squandered.

"It remains to be seen whether this opportunity will yield real results. But the United States, Iran, and the rest of the international community cannot afford to miss or dismiss the potential opportunity before us," according to the letter, which was released by the National Iranian American Council. [IPS | July 16, 2013] □



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## What Others Say

### North Korea and a Nuclear Weapons Ban

By FREDERICK N. MATTIS\*

ANNAPOLIS, USA (IDN) - To abolish nuclear weapons, North Korea and all states would have to join the ban before its entry into force, for three reasons. First, the nuclear ban (or abolition) treaty, often called a Nuclear Weapons Convention, would not create true abolition unless all states are parties to it. Second, current nuclear powers in all likelihood would not join unless the ban when enacted is truly global. (There already exists the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has been joined by all but nine states as “non-nuclear weapon” parties.) Third, unanimity of accession by states would give the ban unprecedented geopolitical force for on-going compliance by states - desirable in itself, and a crucial incentive for today’s nuclear weapon possessors to actually renounce their arsenals.

An enacted nuclear ban treaty would bring the following benefits to all states and people: freedom from the threat of nuclear war or attack, freedom from possible “false-alarm” nuclear missile launch, and freedom from possible terrorist acquisition of a weapon from a state’s nuclear arsenal.

As with all nuclear possessors, North Korea claims that its weapons are for “deterrence.” But the presence of North Korea’s nuclear weapons could actually work to cause demise of the North Korean regime. If the USA, in a moment of crisis, launches a pre-emptive (pre-ventive) strike even with just conventional weapons against North Korea’s nuclear weapons or sites, then a North Korean military response likely would become a full-scale new and terrible Korean War. North Korea can be bellicose, but it is reasonable to believe that North Korea does not want to engage in full-scale war against South Korea and the USA. (The USA, for its part, has proclaimed that it has “no intention” of attacking North Korea.)

North Korea to its credit in 1994 even agreed, without a [prospective] worldwide nuclear ban, to freeze its plutonium-based nuclear weapons development program, and in return was to be provided fuel oil supplies by the USA, plus there was arrangement of construction subsidy for two safeguarded (internationally monitored) light-water nuclear power reactors for North Korean electricity production. Why did this plutonium-centered pact – 1994 “Agreed Framework” – fall apart eight years later in late 2002, which was followed in 2006 by North Korea’s first nuclear test explosion? Because the USA, aggravated when it discerned evidence of undeclared North Korean work or research on uranium enrichment – usable for



nuclear weapons or for other, peaceful purposes – cut off in fall 2002 the fuel oil supplies that were an integral part of the Agreed Framework. North Korea regarded this as abrogation of the Framework, and expelled International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and restarted plutonium nuclear weapons work.

It is conceivable, though, that North Korea would have refused to sign the 1994 Agreed Framework if uranium enrichment research or work was prohibited, and if so inevitably on familiar grounds that enriched uranium has its domestic, non-weapons uses (such as electricity production from power reactors, which generally use low-enriched uranium which is not suitable for weapons). But to those who say that the collapse of the Framework in 2002 shows extreme perfidy on North Korea’s part and that North Korea would never (reliably) maintain a denuclearization agreement, let this serve as a reminder that it was the USA, not North Korea, that first abrogated a major part of the Framework by cutting off oil supplies, and North Korea reacted by declaring the Framework null and void - and resumed plutonium-based weapons work, culminating in first test explosion on 9 October 2006.

#### 2005 Joint Statement of Principles

Between the 2002 demise of the plutonium-centered Framework and that first nuclear test in 2006, a seeming breakthrough occurred with the Sept. 2005 denuclearization agreement called “Six-Party Joint Statement of Principles.” But this soon hit rough seas, particularly on the Statement’s obligation of parties to “discuss at an appropriate time the subject of provision of a light-water [power] reactor to [North Korea].” ➡

*\*Frederick N. Mattis is author of Banning Weapons of Mass Destruction, pub. ABC-Clio/Praeger Security International.*

*Image: A statue of Kim Il-sung. | Credit: Wikimedia Commons*





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When North Korea averred that elimination of its entire nuclear weapons program would have to be preceded by provision of the power reactor (a huge construction project), recriminations ensued. But North Korea's blustery assertiveness on this point was somewhat justified, considering the multi-year delay, under the fallen 1994 Agreed Framework, in merely commencing the Framework's stipulated power reactor construction project: first concrete for footings was poured in early fall 2002 (shortly before the Framework's de facto demise), whereas initial target completion date for first of two promised reactors was 2003.

North Korea and the other parties to the talks, not North Korea alone, deserve retrospective blame for not clarifying in the 2005 Statement of Principles the issue of reactor construction in regards to its time-relation to actual North Korean nuclear disarmament.

With each side accusing the other of abrogating or disregarding the letter or the spirit of the 2005 Statement of Principles, the stage was set for North Korea's aforementioned first (2006) nuclear test explosion. North Korea then returned to negotiations, and in December 2006, North Korea and the others of the six-party talks agreed to reaffirm the 2005 Statement of Principles. North Korea kept its word on this and proceeded to laboriously shut down its source of new weapons plutonium (Yongbyon reactor), and in return for fuel oil from South Korea, weapons inspectors were re-admitted into North Korea – and were given access they needed to confirm North Korea's shutdown of the reactor and later demolition of its cooling tower.

So as of 2007, the North Korean plutonium nuclear weapons program was again stemmed from further growth (as it was for eight years with the 1994 Agreed Framework), although the issue of uranium enrichment – which in some aspects is a more difficult path to a nuclear arsenal than plutonium separation – was still unsettled. This relatively much better state of affairs ended in the wake of North Korea's attempted launch of a satellite on 5 April 2009. The USA and others mightily condemned the launch, because it could have missile-applicability and was seen as severely provocative, whereupon North Korea expelled international inspectors and proclaimed that it was restarting its weapons program, and then conducted its second nuclear test on 25 May 2009.

Before casting all blame and obloquy on North Korea for the demise (although it may be revived in some form) of the denuclearization 2005 Statement of Principles (and subsequent 2007 understandings): the Statement and follow-up discussions did not specifically prohibit North Korean satellite launches, and therefore the launch did

not directly or unequivocally violate that "reigning," 2005 agreement. For its part, though, North Korea has by no means obeyed the panoply of U.N. Security Council Resolutions on its nuclear and missile programs; obviously the "sovereign state" of North Korea does not feel bound by such - which has also been the case for various other countries from time to time.

### **Short-lived 2012 Agreement**

On 29 February 2012, North Korea in a seeming new breakthrough agreed to suspend uranium enrichment activity and institute moratoriums on nuclear and long-range missile tests in exchange for 240,000 metric tons of food aid. Just six weeks later, though (13 April), North Korea attempted to launch another satellite. The effort failed, but its occurrence destroyed the agreement – just as U.S. and others' reaction to North Korean satellite launch attempt of April 2009 had ended North Korean compliance with the 2005 Statement of Principles.

On 12 December 2012 North Korea proceeded with another satellite launch, this one successful. As with the 2009 and April 2012 efforts, because the rocket technology for satellite-launch could be missile-applicable, the USA and others denounced the action and pressed for further international sanctions against North Korea. The angered North Korea then conducted its third nuclear test, on 12 February 2013. But North Korea had never agreed to abstain from space-launches; in any case, one lesson from the roiling waters of nuclear negotiations with North Korea is to not expect anything of North Korea which is not explicitly called for in an agreement.

### **North Korea and a Nuclear Weapons Ban**

Looking forward to a possible nuclear weapons-free world, it bears emphasis that North Korea twice verifiably froze its nuclear weapons (plutonium) program, for eight years with the 1994 Agreed Framework and then with the 2007 shutdown of plutonium-producing reactor and related steps pursuant to 2005 Statement of Principles. Also, although very short-lived, North Korea as just noted agreed (29 February 2012) to halt uranium enrichment and nuclear and long-range missile tests - until food aid promised to North Korea was rescinded when it conducted (failed) satellite launch in April. These actions by North Korea to freeze and in some cases even reverse elements of its nuclear weapons program (such as shutdown of Yongbyon reactor) were undertaken by North Korea despite the absence of a [prospective] worldwide nuclear weapons ban – and surely such a ban, when open for states' signatures, would amplify the prospects that North Korea would join the ban and join the world in eliminating nuclear weapons. ➡



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It is possible, perhaps, that North Korea will (again) freeze important elements of its nuclear program or even eliminate its nuclear weapons, without a worldwide nuclear ban. But presumably this would require a major change in the U.S. stance toward North Korea – including one or more manifestations such as normalization of diplomatic relations, perhaps an official “peace treaty” or non-aggression pact (although the USA, as mentioned, has stated that it has no intention of attacking North Korea), elimination of special U.S.-South Korean military exercises, provision of food aid and power reactor, etc. Given



such prospective requests or demands, nuclear disarmament by North Korea is much more likely to occur in the context of worldwide abolition – which context, to the benefit of the USA and others, would hold much less justification for North Korea (even in its own eyes) to issue extreme “demands” or requirements before it would join. In addition: fealty to elimination of nuclear weapons by North Korea (or any state) would, for geopolitical and psychological reasons, obviously be much stronger with a nuclear ban treaty that regards states equally and that all states have joined.

## Incentives to Join

Following are security and other advantages that would accrue to North Korea if it joined a nuclear weapons ban (along with all other states before entry into force):

- First, under worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons, North Korea would no longer be subject to possible nuclear war – such as escalation of a border conflict with South Korea and its currently nuclear-armed U.S. ally.
- Second, as mentioned earlier, North Korea would not be subject to (or “forced into”) all-out war (nuclear or otherwise) by possible U.S./South Korean pre-emptive attack during a crisis against North Korean nuclear weapons, missiles, or facilities.
- Third, North Korea would be praised worldwide – for playing a crucial role in bringing the worldwide nuclear ban to reality.
- Fourth, states would be inclined to engage in some or additional beneficial action such as trade with North Korea.
- Fifth, on an inner moral level North Korean leaders and the people would feel deserved satisfaction that they had crucially aided worldwide liquidation of nuclear weapons – which persons everywhere know have an abhorrent and inhuman aspect, with their quadruple means of dealing mass death (blast, heat, radiation, fire-storm).
- Sixth, on the “psychological” level of nuclear weaponry and fairness, the USA and North Korea would be equal (with no states having nuclear weapons under the ban).

If, right now, a nuclear ban was introduced for states’ signatures, North Korea probably would decline to be an immediate signatory - or only with likely-unacceptable (extreme and sudden) conditions. But the above-noted security, prosperity, and psychological benefits to North Korea of worldwide nuclear abolition in all likelihood would, as more and more states join the ban and it approaches unanimity needed for entry into force, become evident to North Korea – which would not (as today) be “singled out” for nuclear abolition while other countries maintain their arsenals.

[IDN-InDepthNews – July 19, 2013] □

## Some of the writer's previous articles:

### Calling For a Nuclear Weapons Convention

[http://www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=919:calling-for-a-nuclear-weapons-convention&catid=16:nuclear-abolition-news-and-analysis&Itemid=17](http://www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=919:calling-for-a-nuclear-weapons-convention&catid=16:nuclear-abolition-news-and-analysis&Itemid=17)

### Nuclear and Chem-Bio Weapons Prohibition

[http://www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=780:nuclear-and-chem-bio-weapons-prohibition&catid=16:nuclear-abolition-news-and-analysis&Itemid=17](http://www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=780:nuclear-and-chem-bio-weapons-prohibition&catid=16:nuclear-abolition-news-and-analysis&Itemid=17)

**Warhead Elimination: A Roadmap** >[http://www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=695:-warhead-elimination-a-roadmap-&catid=16:nuclear-abolition-news-and-analysis&Itemid=17](http://www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=695:-warhead-elimination-a-roadmap-&catid=16:nuclear-abolition-news-and-analysis&Itemid=17) .





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### "Ban the Bomb" Resonates Anew\*

By LIV TORRES, Norwegian People's Aid, PHILIP JENNINGS, UNI Global Union

When the 12-year-old son of a friend saw a badge with the slogan "Ban the Bomb", he asked "what bomb?" The slogan may belong to an earlier generation but the threat of nuclear arms remains a deadly reality. This is the largely forgotten elephant in the room which the world must address before it's too late.

The union movement, at the forefront of the campaign against nuclear arms in the Cold War, is once again a vociferous advocate for nuclear disarmament under the umbrella of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). The Doomsday Clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is currently stuck at five minutes to midnight. Its symbolic message is clear: time to act has nearly run out.

Disarmament talks have stalled, two thousand nuclear weapons remain on high alert, and some experts say we will be lucky to survive more than a few decades without another Nagasaki or Hiroshima. Despite the best efforts of the west, nuclear programs continue in volatile and unstable countries such as Iran and North Korea.

With this in mind, is the case for a global armistice a genuine reality? Can we, in fact, ban the bomb? The evidence against appears as substantial as Kim Jong Un's gun rack. Nearly 20,000 nuclear weapons are thought to exist today, held in the arsenals of nine countries.

The historic 2010 pact between Presidents Obama and Medvedev to cut U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads by 25 to 30 percent was supposed to lead to talks on deeper nuclear reductions but disarmament talks have stalled and a nuclear treaty remains very much a distant hope.

The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 showed that even a small nuclear weapon is destructive enough to destroy a city, and kill or injure tens of thousands of people, but what are the likely consequences of a nuclear attack in the 21st century?

Experts say that the detonation of a tiny fraction of the current armaments would bring the global economy and society to its knees, not to mention the death, injury and destruction it would cause.

Recent scientific studies indicate that the use of 100 weapons in a "limited" nuclear war say between India

and Pakistan would affect the global climate for a decade, obscuring the sun and shortening crop-growing seasons.

However, history tells us that the situation has been even more fragile than today and that we must not lose hope. A massive reduction in the number of nuclear weapons is possible. After all, by the 1980s, nearly 70,000 nuclear weapons had been manufactured -- enough to obliterate civilization many times over.

The great reduction of this number is partly in thanks to the immense efforts of trade unions working in partnership with the nuclear disarmament movement that contributed to the Cold War superpowers pulling back from the abyss of nuclear confrontation.

The Cold War has ended, but the world has daydreamed while the nuclear threat has continued to grow with renewed vigor. The call must be reissued for a new global movement to bring nuclear weaponry to its knees.

It is becoming increasingly clear that any ban will not come from the top. Political leadership has failed. Instead, the working people of the world must take the message to Washington and Whitehall ourselves, as we did during the Cold War.

There is much we can do. We must campaign to remove weapons from high alert status, for a reduction in the number of weapons, and for a convention to establish a legal framework. We must act now -- coping with the humanitarian emergency arising from a nuclear weapon detonation is beyond the capacity of any state or international body. The positive news is that attitudes are changing. In March, 127 states, UN humanitarian agencies, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and representatives of civil society, met in Oslo to discuss the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The Oslo conference put the dangers of nuclear weapons front and center for two-thirds of the world's countries and for a growing public movement coordinated by ICAN. ☺

*\*This article is being re-published from the Blog at Huffingtonpost.com which carried it on July 18, 2013*

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# BEYOND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

NEWSLETTER FOR STRENGTHENING AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR ABOLITION WITH JULY 2013 ARTICLES

## What Others Say

The Oslo conference, and a meeting beforehand of more than 500 campaigners and experts, showed that the idea of Banning the Bomb resonates anew, perhaps more strongly than ever. It is a prickly issue, but it affects us all. We should grasp this nettle by supporting ICAN's efforts, and by getting our respective governments to participate in a follow-up to the Oslo conference, to be held in Mexico next year.

As well as its threat to life, the nuclear weapons game is expensive and wasteful of human potential. At a time when governments are reducing investment in programs that grow economies -- education, health and social infrastructure, huge sums of taxpayers' money are being sought to upgrade and maintain nuclear arsenals.

Western democracies hold up nuclear weaponry as the ultimate deterrent -- holding so much power, they argue, makes it impossible to be attacked. But humans are fallible. Sooner or later these weapons will be used, whether by accident or miscalculation, if not design. We are playing Russian roulette with nuclear bullets.

A growing public movement coordinated by the ICAN with the support of organizations such as UNI Global Union, is seeking a treaty banning nuclear weapons because of their humanitarian and environmental consequences. We urge you to join the cause.

After all the stakes are high -- the future of humanity itself could rest upon it. ☐

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## Africa: New Approaches to Nuclear Weapon Disarmament

By NOEL STOTT\*

Tuesday 16 July marked the anniversary of the first nuclear weapon test carried out by the United States (US) in southern New Mexico in 1945. Between then and September 1992, the US tested 1 030 nuclear weapons - all conducted by the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

However, despite President Barack Obama declaring in a speech on 19 June in Berlin that 'so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are not truly safe', and his announcement that he intends to seek further bilateral nuclear weapons reductions with Russia, the US' National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) plans to extend the service life of 400 B61 bombs with an estimated cost of \$10 billion, or \$25 million per bomb.

The B61 is the only US nuclear weapon in Europe, with about 180 stored in five NATO countries.

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive, inhumane and indiscriminate weapons ever created. Unlike other weapons, they have the potential to not only kill millions of people but also to disrupt the global climate, cause widespread famine and spread genetically damaging radioactive fallout.

1 July 2013 also marked the 45th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in Washington, Moscow and London in 1968.

Notwithstanding the commitment made by signing and ratifying this treaty, little progress has been made by the

permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council - the US, United Kingdom (UK), China, Russia and France - as well as India, Pakistan and Israel to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons.

This has resulted in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation discourse recently shifting to two new fronts:

An approach that focuses on the devastating global consequence and impact that the use of a nuclear weapon today would have on humanity.

The need to implement measures to reduce the risk of nuclear material and other radioactive material falling into the hands of state and non-state actors who might use such material for malicious acts.

In March 2013, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Espen Barth Eide, hosted an international conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The conference provided an arena for a fact-based discussion of the humanitarian and developmental consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation. ☞

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\*Noel Stott is Senior Research Fellow, Transnational Threats and International Crime Division, at Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Pretoria. This article was first carried by *allafrica.com* on July on July 17, 2013.



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NEWSLETTER FOR STRENGTHENING AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR ABOLITION WITH JULY 2013 ARTICLES

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Delegates from 127 countries as well as several UN organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, representatives of civil society and other relevant stakeholders concluded that:

It is unlikely that any state or international body could address the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation in an adequate manner and provide sufficient assistance to those affected.

Historical experience of the use and testing of nuclear weapons has demonstrated their devastating immediate and long-term effects. While political circumstances have changed, the destructive potential of nuclear weapons remains.

The effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, irrespective of cause, will not be constrained by national borders, and will affect states and people in significant ways, regionally as well as globally.

Although the five nuclear-armed permanent members of the UN Security Council did not attend, this approach is gaining momentum and Mexico has agreed to host a follow-up meeting in early 2014.

In recent years increasing attention has been paid to the risk of armed non-state actors obtaining nuclear or other radioactive material for malicious acts. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recorded numerous cases of theft and other unauthorised activities involving nuclear and radioactive material.

As more countries seek to make use of nuclear energy for their electricity needs, the availability of nuclear material is expected to grow, increasing the risks of illicit trafficking. Radioactive substances of the type held in hospitals also need to be better regulated.

Even a relatively small amount of material such as cobalt-60 - used in radiotherapy - could cause serious harm if combined with conventional explosives in a so-called dirty bomb.

With this in mind, the IAEA's recent international conference on 'Nuclear security: enhancing global efforts' addressed international nuclear security efforts by reviewing past achievements and current approaches, as well as identifying future trends. Ministers, policymakers and senior officials formulated views on the future directions

and priorities for nuclear security. While it was agreed that nuclear security is a national responsibility, the importance of bilateral, regional and international cooperation to enhance national nuclear security regimes was flagged as a crucial means to reduce the threat.

In this regard, the ratification and entry-into-force of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which obliges countries to protect nuclear material when it is being used or stored and to protect nuclear facilities against acts of sabotage, was prioritised.

With more than 1 300 registered participants, including some 34 government ministers and other delegation heads from 125 states, as well as 21 governmental and non-governmental organisations, the conference provided a forum for input into the IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan 2014-2017 and the longer-term planning and implementation of its nuclear security programme.

The Ministerial Declaration arising out of the conference affirmed the central role of the IAEA in strengthening nuclear security globally, and leading coordination of international activities in this field.

It also encouraged all states to join and participate in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database, the international repository of information about nuclear and other radioactive material that has fallen out of regulatory control.

In his closing statement to the conference, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said: 'This conference has been an important milestone for nuclear security. The Ministerial Statement, from an inclusive global forum, sends a strong message that nuclear security is recognised as a priority by governments.'

That political commitment is crucial to all of us in developing the policies, strategies and systems to strengthen nuclear security, nationally, regionally and globally.'

Both approaches - the humanitarian lens to nuclear weapons proliferation and the need to better secure nuclear and radioactive material - have as their basis the recognition that their respective use or misuse is a concern for the whole of humanity; and that the use of a nuclear weapon in conflict by a state or an explosive device containing radioactive material detonated by a non-state actor will have grave humanitarian consequences that will spread beyond national borders. □

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## What Others Say

### The Perils of Nuclear Folly

By ARUN KUMAR SINGH\*

Recently, the well-known website [www.foreignpolicy.com](http://www.foreignpolicy.com) examined 12 factors to determine what constituted failed states. "Postcards from hell, 2013" lists failed or "expected to fail states". Somalia tops the list, while Afghanistan is placed at number seven.

Pakistan and North Korea, the two nuclear-armed nations that are close allies of China, are placed at number 13 and number 23 respectively. The last two should be a cause for serious worry. North Korea presently has less than four nuclear weapons, and its recent sabre rattling ended in a whimper.

It is clarified that nuclear weapons are of two types, viz fission bombs with yields of 14 to 20 kilo tonnes (KT), of the type dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (they use a conventional explosive to trigger uranium or plutonium charge), and the more powerful thermonuclear (fusion) weapons (which use a fission bomb to trigger the plutonium charge to get yields ranging from about 60 KT to over 25 mega tonnes).

These nuclear bombs (fission or fusion) achieve deterrence by their ability to destroy cities — called "counter value" (counter value is the targeting of an opponent's assets which are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations) — but they can also be used to target enemy underground missile silos, national and military command and control centres, called "counter force".

As proved in the Cold War, counter force is very expensive. In addition, another type of bomb — typically a plutonium "fission" bomb generally below 5 KT — can be used against the enemy Army or warship formations. They are called Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs). Russia and the United States of America have removed TNWs from their arsenals by mutual agreement, as their use could initiate a nuclear war.

China and Pakistan have TNWs, but India does not. This is important, as India's No First-Use (NFU) nuclear doctrine is based purely on counter value targeting, whilst Pakistan has an ambiguous nuclear doctrine which is based on first strike. China in its previous six defence white papers had an NFU doctrine but has created ambiguity in its seventh defence white paper for the year 2013 by not mentioning its nuclear doctrine. Both Pakistan and China



have sufficient weapons to destroy all 50 Indian cities that have a population of over one million.

Taking into account only counter value targeting, if we count cities with population above one million people, then China has 160, India has 50 and Pakistan has 10. The number of bombs India needs, to simultaneously deter Pakistan and China with an NFU doctrine would be about 500.

In April 2013, SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) announced that India, Pakistan and China had each increased their stockpile of nuclear weapons by 10. Hence, as of 2013, India has about 110 nuclear weapons, Pakistan 120, and China 250.

India produces only plutonium based thermonuclear fusion weapons, and may continue to expand its arsenal at about five to 10 bombs a year, given that its deterrence is based only on counter value targeting. Pakistan has four operational weapon grade plutonium making nuclear plants in Khushab district of Punjab and produces some weapon grade plutonium already.

After 2015, it will produce about 100 kilograms of plutonium annually (enough for about 25 fission type TNWs annually). While its existing highly enriched uranium (HEU) capability will continue to produce about five to seven uranium fission bombs annually, Pakistan may be capable of producing 30 nuclear weapons annually in a few years from now, based on availability of weapons grade plutonium and uranium, provided it has the requisite capacity of machinery and skilled manpower.

In 2011, a team from Georgetown University, Washington, startled the world with its findings that China had an estimated 3,000 nuclear weapons (instead of the 240 assumed earlier). This claim was contested by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, which in 2011 estimated that China could make 450 to 600 thermonuclear warheads, using its estimated stockpile of 1.8 tonnes of plutonium. ➔

\*The writer retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam, India. This article first appeared on July 5, 2013 on The Asian age website > <http://www.asianage.com/columnists/perils-nuclear-folly-738>



# BEYOND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

NEWSLETTER FOR STRENGTHENING AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR ABOLITION WITH JULY 2013 ARTICLES

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Further, China had about 20 tonnes of HEU that could be used to make 640 to 1,060 uranium bombs. This means that China may already have a nuclear arsenal of about 1,000 nuclear bombs, and is, perhaps, waiting for the US and Russia to announce a reduction of their arsenals to 1,000 each (from the present 1,550 each) before announcing its nuclear weapons holdings.

Retired Indian and Pakistani scientists, diplomats and military experts hold bilateral Track II "Nuclear Stability" talks regularly. These talks have produced sensible proposals on civil nuclear plant safety (including severe nuclear accident management) and nuclear stability (maintaining unilateral moratorium on testing, keeping nuclear weapons de-mated, prevention of inadvertent nuclear escalation, non-attacks on each other's National Command Authority) etc. Since India's concerns also include China, trilateral Track II talks comprising India, China and Pakistan would be logical.

China has a proven a Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) capability that has got India worried. India is building its own BMDS, which, in turn, has worried Pakistan. Pakistan is increasing its arsenal to overcome the Indian BMDS by multiple attack capability on Indian cities (possibly Delhi and Mumbai) expected to be protected by BMDS (under DRDO development presently). Hence nuclear stability in Asia is directly linked to the existing and emerging capabilities of the US, Russia and China.

Unfortunately, Asia does not appear destined for nuclear stability and a nuclear arms race has begun, with Iran likely to join the nuclear club, given its animosity to nuclear-armed Israel. A major terror attack could lead to a conventional war, which could lead to a nuclear war.

Nuclear weapons and BMDS are here to stay but nuclear stability in Asia can still be achieved if:

The US and Russia agree to further reduce their arsenals to below 1,000 weapons each, and China concurrently agrees to join India and Pakistan in Track II and Track I nuclear stability talks.

China, which supplies almost 85 per cent of North Korea's food and energy needs, agrees to "freeze" North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programmes at the present level.

Pakistan gives up its policy of exporting terror, and eliminates terrorism on its soil.

The UK and France further reduce their weapons stocks from 180 and 300 respectively, as they have no known "enemies".

Israel becomes an overt nuclear state, and declares its arsenal.

All nuclear powers declare an NFU doctrine. □



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NEWSLETTER FOR STRENGTHENING AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR ABOLITION WITH JULY 2013 ARTICLES

## Civil Society Perspective

### Continuing the Struggle

By DAVID KRIEGER

I have been working for a world free of nuclear weapons for over four decades. On occasion I am asked, "Why do you continue this struggle when change seems to come so slowly?" Here is my response.

Nuclear weapons threaten the existence of civilization and the human species. We humans cannot continue to be complacent in the face of the nuclear dangers that confront us. Too many people are complacent and too many are ignorant of the threat posed by these weapons.

Albert Einstein warned: "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." The nature of the catastrophe was demonstrated first at Hiroshima and then at Nagasaki. We continue to face the possibility of a global Hiroshima.

If even a few nuclear weapons were used today, the humanitarian consequences would be beyond our capacity to cope. There would not be enough surviving medical personnel available to aid the suffering of the victims. There would not be enough hospitals or burn wards. Water supplies would be contaminated. Infrastructure would be destroyed. The damage would not be containable in either time or space.

Atmospheric scientists have modeled the effects of the use of nuclear weapons. They find that the use of only one hundred Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons in a regional war between India and Pakistan would trigger a nuclear famine that would lead to the deaths by starvation of some one billion people globally. That would be the result of a small nuclear war. How would this happen? The weapons would destroy cities, putting massive amounts of soot into the stratosphere, blocking warming sunlight, shortening growing seasons, causing crop failures and food shortages.

A large-scale nuclear war between the US and Russia would, of course, be far worse, lowering temperatures on Earth to Ice Age levels. There would be few survivors.

All this is to say that perhaps I know too much. I cannot stop struggling to end the nuclear weapons era. I am challenged to fight against ignorance and indifference. I know that this is not a problem that can be set aside with the expectation that it will take care of itself.

There has been progress. By 1986, the number of nuclear weapons in the world had ballooned to 70,000. Today,



the number is around 17,000. Over 50,000 nuclear weapons have been eliminated. That is worth celebrating, but not for too long. It hasn't changed the fundamental proposition that nuclear war could destroy most complex life on the planet, and this planet remains the only place we know of in the universe where life exists. As Carl Sagan used to remind us, we live on a "pale blue dot," our planetary home, one which is infinitesimally small in relation to the universe, but infinitely precious.

President Obama, in a recent speech in Berlin, stated, "Peace with justice means pursuing the security of a world without nuclear weapons – no matter how distant that dream may be." Yes, we – all of us – need the security of a world without nuclear weapons, but why must the dream be distant? Why must we think of the dream as being distant? Why must President Obama frame it in this way? Is he not demonstrating a deficit of leadership in doing so? Whose interests are being served – those of corporate weapons makers or those of the people of the world?

Nuclear deterrence does not protect us. If it did, there would be no need for missile defenses. Nor would we object to other countries developing nuclear deterrent forces. And, of course, nuclear deterrence does not even apply to terrorist organizations, which have no territory to retaliate against and may be suicidal.

Nuclear weapons are actually suicidal weapons. Use them, and they will be used against you. Use them, and run the risk of nuclear famine or nuclear winter. They may also be omnicidal weapons, their use leading to the death of all.

If we want to end the insecurity of a world with nuclear weapons, we must continue the struggle for a world without them. And we must realize that the nature of the weapons require that the struggle be approached with a sense of urgency and boldness.

So, I continue the struggle – in the hope that you may join with me and many others to make the abolition of nuclear weapons an urgent – rather than distant – dream. □

*David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation*





# BEYOND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

NEWSLETTER FOR STRENGTHENING AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR ABOLITION WITH JULY 2013 ARTICLES

## Civil Society Perspective

### India Lambasted for Activation of Nuclear Submarine and Missile Test

CNDP Statement



[Pressenza] We strongly condemn India's recent activation of a nuclear-propelled submarine quickly followed by flight-test of another nuclear-capable missile. Brandishing these tools of mass destruction as guarantees of national security while ignoring the issues of real safety, security and well-being of the Indian people demonstrates a perverse pathology.

Naming the submarine "Arihant" after a holy figure from Jainism which stands for peace is yet another cruel irony similar to "the Buddha smiled" code for the 1974 nuclear test. It also obfuscates the reality that the "indigenous" submarine is critically based on borrowed military technology and the fact that huge imports of such technology and weapons systems are bleeding our economy.

Far from providing us security, nuclear weaponisation has led to a sharp rise in the defence budget, more instability in South Asia and an escalating regional arms race. In the 15th year after the Pokharan-II tests, important

lessons need to be learnt. To get the sanctions imposed after the nuclear tests removed and to get an elusive legitimate nuclear weapons-state status, India promised to buy reactors from the US, France and Russia. These are now being imposed on Indian farmers and fishermen by brutal force. The rise of national chauvinism and sectarianism in all of South Asia is yet another deplorable fallout of this nuclear nationalism.

We urge the government to desist from further escalation of the arms race, strengthen confidence-building measures with our neighbours, resume a dialogue with Pakistan, and negotiate a South Asian nuclear weapons-free zone treaty at the earliest.

For the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace: Achin Vanaik, Praful Bidwai, Lalita Ramdas, Abey George, Kumar Sundaram | <http://cndpindia.org/cndp-statement-against-indias-acquisition-of-nuclear-submarine-and-missile/> □

### Trident still has nowhere to go

[Camapign for Nuclear Disarmament – CND] July 1|July 2013] Recent media reports have suggested that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is considering the possibility of making the Trident submarine base at Faslane into UK sovereign territory in the event of Scottish independence.

The fact that No.10 has now slapped down the MoD over this suggestion is to be welcomed. But it is no surprise that the MoD has looked into this option: because as we reported in January 2012 - Trident has nowhere to go.

Our report, Trident: Nowhere to Go, uses Ministry of Defence documents to show that there are simply no suitable sites for relocation of Trident, in the event that it is ejected from Scotland following a yes vote in the independence referendum. The findings of our report were used by the Scottish Affairs Committee in its analysis of the implications of Scottish independence for Trident.

Estimates from experts and the MoD put the cost and timeframe of relocation at tens of billions over a period of 20 years or more. And then there are issues such as the evacuation of local populations and closure of local industries. □





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NEWSLETTER FOR STRENGTHENING AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR ABOLITION WITH JULY 2013 ARTICLES



TOWARD A NUCLEAR FREE WORLD



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


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By GARETH PORTER

WASHINGTON (IPS) - Newly published recollections by the former French ambassador to Iran suggest that Iran was not running a covert nuclear weapons programme that it then decided to halt in late 2003, as concluded by U.S. intelligence in 2007.

Ambassador Francois Nicoulaud recounted conversations with high-ranking Iranian officials indicating that Tehran's then nuclear policy chief – and now president-elect – Hassan Rouhani did not know what research projects relating to nuclear weapons had been carried out over the years. [P] [JAPANESE TEXT VERSION PDF](#)

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### North Korea and a Nuclear Weapons Ban

Nuclear Abolition News Essay | IDN

By FREDERICK N. MATTIS\*

ANNAPOLIS, USA (IDN) - To abolish nuclear weapons, North Korea and all states would have to join the ban before its entry into force, for three reasons. First, the nuclear ban (or abolition) treaty, often called a Nuclear Weapons Convention, would not create true abolition unless all states are parties to it. Second, current nuclear powers in all likelihood would not join unless the ban when enacted is truly global. (There already exists the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has been joined by all but nine states as "non-nuclear weapon" parties.) Third, unanimity of accession by states would give the ban unprecedented geopolitical force for ongoing compliance by states - desirable in itself, and a crucial incentive for today's nuclear weapon possessors to actually renounce their arsenals.



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### Israel Resumes Threats Against Iran as Experts Urge Patience



Nuclear Abolition News | IPS

By JIM LOBE

WASHINGTON (IPS) - As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu resumed his threats to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, 29 former senior U.S. experts and foreign diplomats urged President Barack Obama to show greater flexibility in anticipated negotiations following the inauguration of President-elect Hassan Rouhani.

"While it will take time to secure an agreement to resolve all concerns, diplomacy will only succeed if we are prepared to leverage existing sanctions and other incentives in exchange for reciprocal Iranian concessions," according to the letter.

It was signed by, among others, former U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs Thomas Pickering and Bruno Pelletau, the former deputy director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). [P] [JAPANESE TEXT VERSION PDF](#)

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